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process
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his constitutional right to due process
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the State's evidence at trial was sufficient to

establish, as an integral element of the charged crimes, defendant's
ownership of the subject property beyond a reasonable doubt.

When

reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial,
the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard, "which

4

requires that 'if the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a
criminal case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set
aside.'"

State

(quoting State
Corp.

v.

v.
v.

Spotts,

Featherson,

Walker,

781 P.2d

424, 431-32

(Utah 1989)

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); Provo

861 P.2 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) .

City

Notwithstanding

the foregoing, the appellate court has the ultimate power to conduct
an independent review of constitutional claims such as the issue in
this case concerning the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
as required by the constitutional right to due process.
Thurman,
deference

846 P. 2d 1256, 1266
is

accorded

to

(Utah 1993) .

factual

See State

v.

Although considerable

findings,

the

trial

court's

conclusion of law that ownership by Defendant of the subject property
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt is given no special deference
and thus reviewed for correctness.
93 9 (Utah 1994) .

See State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

Trial counsel preserved this issue, as well as

subsidiary issues, by moving to dismiss after the State's case-inchief (R. 162-63, Transcript of Trial).
2.

Whether the trial court, by failing to rule on the pending

motions before it on temporary remand from this Court, erred by
failing to fully and fairly address all the issues surrounding the
altered exhibit as implicitly required by this Court's temporary
remand Order

-- thereby frustrating the judicial process by its
5

failure to fully and fairly resolve the matters before it pertaining
to the altered exhibit.
comply with

this Court

The claim that the trial court failed to
Order

reviewed for correctness.

is a conclusion of

See State

v. Pena,

law, which is

869 P. 2d 932, 939 (Utah

1994).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose

interpretation

is determinative,

are

set out

verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about June 22, 1994, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers, by way of
Information, was charged with a zoning ordinance violation, a class
B

misdemeanor,

which was

amended

to

a class

C misdemeanor,

violation of Weber County Zoning Ordinance 5-1 et seq.,

in

and a fire

ordinance violation, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Weber
County Fire Code Ordinance 11-1-1 et seg., and violation of the Utah
Fire Code § 79.101 et seg., in relation to the subject property
located at approximately 4425 East Highway 162 in Weber County.
bench trial was held before

the District

Baldwin on January 12 and 17, 1995.

A

Court Judge Parley R.

Upon conclusion of the bench

trial, the trial court immediately found Defendant guilty on both
counts.
6

At sentencing on April 20, 1995, the trial court, for the zoning
violation, imposed a fine in the amount of $750.00 and 90 days in the
Weber County Jail.

The trial court suspended $500.00 of the fine and

the 90 days in jail

"on the condition that every ounce of that

equipment is taken out of there within 30 days."

For the

fire code

ordinance violation, the trial court again imposed a fine in the
amount of $750.00 and 90 days in the Weber County Jail, which was
suspended on the same condition as that on the zoning violation.
The trial court signed its Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) on April
20, 1998, which was entered that same day.

Defendant filed Notice of

Appeal on May 11, 1998.
On appeal, Defendant, on January 9, 1996, filed a Motion to Stay
Briefing

Deadline

Pending

Temporary

Remand

Determination Concerning Trial Exhibit.

to

Trial

Court

for

On January 29, 1996, this

Court granted Defendant's Motion to Stay, temporarily remanding the
case to the trial court for a determination as to the alleged exhibit
tampering.

Approximately

one

year

later,

the

trial

court's

incomplete findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the altered
exhibit issue were filed in this Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about June 22, 1994, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers, by way

of Information, was charged with a zoning ordinance violation, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Weber County Zoning Ordinance 5-

7

1 et seq. ,x and a fire ordinance violation, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Weber County Fire Code Ordinance 11-1-1 et seq. , and
violation of the Utah Fire Code § 79.101 et seq.,2

in relation to the

subject property located at approximately 4425 East Highway 162 in
Weber County (R. 1-3, Information and Summons);
2.

A bench trial was held on the charges before the Honorable

Parley R. Baldwin on September 12 and 17, 1995 (R. 60-330, Transcript
of Trial) ;
3.

At trial, during the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Craig C.

Barker, Director of the Weber County Planning Commission, testified
as follows:
MS. HURTADO:

Mr. Barker, let me hand this to you.
And do you recognize what this is?

MR. BARKER:

Yes, I do.

MS. HURTADO:

And what is it?

*As to the alleged zoning ordinance violation in Count I of the
Information, the State, in the Information, alleges that Mr. Ronnie
Earl Chambers, between September 22, 1992, to June 22, 1994, violated
the Weber County zoning ordinance by "keeping and maintaining a
construction equipment yard located at approximately 4425 East
Highway 162, in Weber County in an A-1 zone where a construction
equipment yard is not a permitted nor a conditional use." (R. 1,
Information).
2

In Count II of the Information, which is the alleged fire
ordinance violation, the State alleges that between May 6, 1994, and
June 22, 1994, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers violated the Weber County
Fire Ordinance "by keeping and maintaining fuel tanks, located at
approximately 4425 East Highway 162, in Weber County, in violation of
the Uniform Fire Code, Article No. 79- [sic] Flammable and
Combustible Liquids, as adopted by the Weber County Fire Code
Ordinances." (R. 2, Information).
8

MR, BARKER:

This is an enlargement of the property -Weber County property plat for the property
in question -- one of the properties shown
on this plat.

MS, HURTADO:

And does that accurately depict that area
that is showing?

MR. BARKER:

I believe it does, yes.

MS. HURTADO:

Now, if you would, could you please stand
and for the record note where the property
in question is on this diagram?

MR. BARKER:

This property identified -- this is a
partial number of the land serial number
for the property which is noted here as
0144. It says Ronnie Earl Chambers on it.

MS. HURTADO:

Mr. Storey -- Mr. Storey, I'm sorry. Mr.
Barker, you are familiar with this map.
Are you familiar with any changes that
occurred in this map over the last ten
years, for example, as far as ownership?

MR. BARKER:

Yes, I happened to review the property
ownership books of prior years -- 1966, for
example -- that we have on our -- in our
office, and noted that the property is -Mr. Chambers' property was not separated
from the property noted on there as No.
0027, at that time. It was all one parcel.

(R. 76-77, Transcript of Trial);

3

0n cross-examination, Mr. Barker admitted basing his ownership
determination of the property in 1989 merely on the correspondence in
his complaint file (R. 84-85, Transcript of Trial). In fact, when
pressed about how he determined ownership of the property in 1989,
Mr. Barker admitted that "there is another member of the planning
commission who would - doing the complaints at the time may be able
to better answer that than I." (Id. at 84, lines 16-25).
9

4.

During the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Edward T. Reed, a

former planning

commission

member

on

the Weber

County

Planning

Commission, testified as follows:
MS. HURTADO:

Noting
this
document
[referring
to
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 ] , do you recognize
this, that's on the wall?

MR. REED:

This document is an enlargement of -- it
appears
to
be
the
official
county
recorder's plats.

MS. HURTADO:

And can you identify
property on that?

MR. REED:

I can, yes.

MS. HURTADO:

Will you just point to it?

MR. REED:

This is the defendant's property here.

•

*

*

the

defendant's

*

MS. HURTADO:

And what complaint was brought
attention on this matter?

MR. REED:

That there
property.

MS. HURTADO:

And what was your action in response to
that complaint?

MR. REED:

Reaction to that was to actually go up and
look at the property and to see what was on
the property.

MS. HURTADO:

And what did you observe at that time?

MR. REED:

Based on my recollection -- and I have no
documentation in the file -- that there was
a front-end loader on the property, and I
believe a pile of gravel.

MS. HURTADO:

When are you referring to, as far as time?

10

was

equipment

parked

to

on

your

the

MR. REED:

I believe that was probably in 1989 when we
received the complaint.

MS. HURTADO:

And who did you address that to at that
time; do you recall?

MR. REED:

At that time I believe contact was made
with Earl Chambers.

(R. 87, lines 6-14, R. 88-89, Transcript of Trial);
5.

On

cross-examination,

Mr.

Reed

elicited

the

following

testimony concerning ownership of the subject property:
MR. ARNOLD:

Now, you testified, did you not, that this
is Ronnie Chambers' property?

MR. REED:

That's correct.

MR. ARNOLD:

Can you tell me what you base that decision
on?

MR. REED:

Ronnie Chambers' property?

MR. ARNOLD:

Yes,

MR. REED:

I base it on the fact that that is a blowup
of the county recorder's plats and Mr.
Ronnie Earl Chambers' name is on it.

MR. ARNOLD:

When was that made?

MR. REED:

This particular plat, I couldn't tell you
when it was made.

MR. ARNOLD:

Is it possible that Mr. Chambers could have
conveyed that property since that time?

MR. REED:

That's a possibility.

MR. ARNOLD:

And is it possible that sometime between
somebody writing Mr. Chambers' name on
there and when you looked at it, he could
have conveyed that property away, prior to
that?

11

MR. REED:

That's a possibility, I suppose.

MR. ARNOLD:

So, it's possible that he doesn't own the
property then; isn't that correct?

MR. REED:

I have no knowledge whether he owns the
property now or not.

MR. ARNOLD:

Or owned it when you looked at the map?

MR. REED:

Well, that's entirely possible.

(R. 99-100, Transcript of Trial);
6.

On

redirect

examination,

Mr.

Reed

then

testified

as

follows:
MS. HURTADO:

And is there an investigation conducted as
far as that observation you made on that
complaint?

MR. REED:

Yes

MS. HURTADO:

And what kind of investigation is that?

MR. REED:

What I would do is I would go back to the
office, locate it on the maps that we have
available, and that would include the
county recorder's maps. And we would also
secure the data that the county recorder
has on file as to the ownership of the
property. That would include the -- verify
the name, that would give the address of
the property owner.

MS. HURTADO:

On this complaint in particular, did you do
the normal investigation?

MR. REED:

I worked it up, yes; that's correct.

MS. HURTADO:

So, at that time did you verify who was the
owner?

MR. REED:

At that time, it was Mr. Chambers.

MS. HURTADO:

And that was in 1992?
12

MR. REED:

That's correct.

(R. 101, Transcript of Trial);
7.

Mr. Reed testified to the following on recross examination:
MR. ARNOLD:

When you went out in May of 198 9 and took
these photographs --

MR. REED:

Yes.

MR. ARNOLD:

-- you didn't verify who
then; did you?

MR. REED:

As I recall, I believe I did, yes.

MR. ARNOLD:

How did you do that?

MR. REED:

I can do that by looking at the county
recorder's plats and calling up the county
recorder's office.

MR. ARNOLD:

Can you specifically recall the county
recorder telling you that that was owned by
Ronnie Chambers?

MR. REED:

As I -- that's going back quite a ways.
But, yes, I believe that's correct.

MR. ARNOLD:

you remember that conversation?

MR. REED:

Not, you know, word
conversation, no.

MR. ARNOLD:

Okay. Do you know what the county recorder
looked at to verify that information?

MR. REED:

What they would look at is what --

MR. ARNOLD:

No, do you know what he looked at -- or he
looked at at that time?

MR. REED:

When I make a call, all I do -- what they
do is they pull it up on their screen.

MR. ARNOLD:

On their computer screen?

13

for

the owner was

word

of

the

MR. REED:

That's correct,

MR. ARNOLD:

Who did you talk to?

MR. REED:

I have -- I couldn't tell you, at the time.

MR. ARNOLD:

Couldn't remember who you talked to?

MR. REED:

No.

MR. ARNOLD:

Do you remember them pulling it up on their
computer screen?

MR. REED:

Uh, no. All I did is call over and ask for
a check on, you know, the ownership of the
property.

MR. ARNOLD:

Okay.

MR. REED:

As I recall, yes, I did.

MR. ARNOLD:

And you did it again in 1994?

MR. REED:

Two,

MR. ARNOLD:

This particular map here says it's owned by
two individuals; doesn't it?

MR. REED:

Well, I thought
chambers.

MR. ARNOLD:

What were you
conversation?

MR. REED:

I couldn't tell you that.

MR. ARNOLD:

You can't remember what you were told?

MR. REED:

No, I cannot remember that.

MR. ARNOLD:

So, you don't really recollect what you -who you were told as being the owner, then?

MR. REED:

To tell you precisely, no,

And you did that in 1989?

x

92 and x 94.

(R. 101-03, Transcript of Trial);

14

it

told

said

in

Ronnie

the

Earl

telephone

8.

On further redirect examination, Mr. Reed testified as

follows:
MS. HURTADO:

As part of your procedure, how do you
document that you know who the owner of
this is, as far as the complaint procedure?

MR. REED:

Well, as far as the complaint goes, I would
look at the plat, and to verify, you know,
who owns the property at the period of time
I'm looking at the plat, I would call over
to the county recorder's office.

(R. 103-04, Transcript of Trial);
9.

In

regard

to Mr. Reed's

prior

testimony

that

he

had

confirmed ownership by Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers of the property in
1989 by looking at county recorder plats and by calling and speaking
with the county recorder's office (see id.

at R. 101-02), Mr. Reed

testified to the following on further recross-examination:
MR. ARNOLD:

Just shortly, a few minutes ago, it was
your
testimony
that
you
took
these
photographs in 1989; is that correct?

MR. REED:

That's correct.

MR. ARNOLD:

On the date so stated, May 23rd?

MR. REED:

That's correct.

MR. ARNOLD:

And it was your testimony that at that
point in time you tried to determine who
the property owner was and you looked at
the plat map, call the county recorder's
office, and as you recall, you were given
the name Ronnie Chambers?

MR. REED:

Uh-huh.

15

MR. ARNOLD:

If that were the case, Mr. Reed, why, then,
would you direct this letter in June of x89
to Mr. Storey, the supposed property owner?

MR. REED:

Because Mr. Storey was on the property
plats as owner, he and his son, Eric.

MR. ARNOLD:

So, you didn't see Mr. Chambers
property plat, then; did you?

MR. REED:

Not at this particular time, evidently.

MR. ARNOLD:

And evidently the recorder didn't tell you
that Ronnie Chambers was the property
owner; did she?

MR. REED:

That would be correct, based on this letter

on the

here.
(R. 106-07, Transcript of Trial);
10.

During the State's case-in-chief, Ms. Yvonne E. Storey, a

prior owner of the subject property, testified as follows:
MS. STOREY:
Okay, The property we've been discussing
today, we didn't sell it. My son, Eric,
had a home there and my husband, Boyd,
decided to deed Eric some of that land,
from our name to his name.
And at that
time we decided to deed about approximately
an acre to Earl Chambers. Now, I say it
was Earl because that's all I know.
It
might be -- I don't know what it says on
the deed. But it was just my understanding
that that acre was deeded to Earl Chambers.
(R. Ill, lines 8-15, Transcript of Trial);
11.

During the State's case-in-chief, in the course of the

direct examination of Mr. Glen E. Burton, the Chief of the Weber Fire
District, and his testimony

concerning

16

the

investigation of the

alleged fire ordinance violation, the following exchange took place
between counsel and the trial court:
MR. ARNOLD:

Objection, Your Honor. That's hearsay. If
he's going to tell what Earl said they're
doing with the tanks, that's hearsay.

THE COURT:

That's not hearsay as it relates to the
defendant.

MS. HURTADO:

It's party opponent --

MR. ARNOLD:

Excuse me?

MS. HURTADO:

He's a defendant in this matter.

THE COURT:

That's not hearsay, when you're talking --

MR. ARNOLD:

Excuse me, Earl Chambers is not a defendant
in this matter, Your Honor.
Ronnie
Chambers is.

THE COURT:

Okay.
Thank you for that distinction.
Ronnie Earl Chambers -- There's a Ronnie
Earl Chambers and an Earl Chambers; is that
correct?

MR. ARNOLD:

Yes.
Could we -- can we clarify which
Chambers he's talking to?

THE COURT:

Yes,

MR. BURTON:

I was speaking
father.

MR. ARNOLD:

And he's not a defendant in this action,
Your Honor, and I would object to that.

THE COURT:

Ms. Hurtado?

MS. HURTADO:

He represented himself to be the owner of
the property when he approached him.

(R. 139-41, Transcript of Trial);

17

of

Earl

Chambers, Ron's

12.

Upon the State resting its case, trial counsel for Mr.

Ronnie Earl Chambers' moved to dismiss on the grounds that the State
had failed to tie the charges to Defendant inasmuch as there had
"been

absolutely

no

testimony

whatsoever"

that

Defendant

was

"conducting anything on that property . . ." and that there had been
only "futile attempts to establish that he is the supposed property
owner . . . ." (R. 162, lines 4-14, Transcript of Trial).

The trial

court denied the motion because, as the court stated, "The testimony
has, in fact, been -- and is shown up there -- that that particular
plat

[Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that can be challenged, clearly --

shows that the owner of this property is the defendant.

As a result

of that, the motion is denied at this point." (R. 162, lines 19-23,
Transcript of Trial).

In response, counsel argued the following:

There's been no testimony . . . as to when that
map was created.
There is no testimony that
that map was created during the periods of time
that the allegation is made that [Defendant]
made that offense. And I don't think the Court
can rely upon that to attach criminal activity
to my client. Simply that somebody has put his
name on something that hasn't been established,
a foundation or anything like that.
(R. 163, Transcript of Trial);
13.

Upon

conclusion

of

the

bench

trial,

the

trial

court

immediately found Defendant guilty on both counts (R. 327-29, lines
11-14, R. Transcript of Trial);
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14.

In the course of its determination that Defendant violated

the zoning ordinance, the trial court, as the basis for its ruling,
stated:
Some question had been raised about whether or
not -- who owns this property.
The prima
facie
standard
was met when the plats were admitted from the
county recorder's office showing the defendant owns
that. There is a deed here in "91. The brother has
testified that this is the other brother's property
and he allows him on with that equipment.
(R. 327, lines 5-10, Transcript of Trial);
15.

At sentencing on April 20, 1995, the trial court, for the

zoning violation, imposed a fine in the amount of $750.00 and 90 days
in the Weber County Jail.

The trial court suspended $500.00 of the

fine and the 90 days in jail "on the condition that every ounce of
that equipment is taken out of there within 30 days."

For the

fire

code ordinance violation, the trial court again imposed a fine in the
amount of $750.00 and 90 days in the Weber County Jail, which was
suspended on the same condition as that on the zoning violation
(Transcript of Sentencing (April 20, 1995), pp. 5-6);
16.
on April

The trial court signed its Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)
20, 1998, which was entered

that

same day

(R. 34-35,

Judgment, Sentence (Commitment))/
17.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on May 11, 1998 (R. 37-38,

Notice of Appeal);
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On January 9, 1996,

18.

Defendant / Appellant filed a Motion to

Stay Briefing Deadline Pending Temporary Remand to Trial Court For
Determination Concerning Trial Exhibit;
19.

By Order dated January 29, 1996, this Court granted the

Motion to Stay and temporarily remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination as to the alleged exhibit tampering;
20.

Thereafter, by way

of

telephone, Ms. Monette Hurtado,

Deputy Weber County Attorney, informed Defendant's appellate counsel
that an employee at Kinko's, per her instructions prior to trial, had
handwritten the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the plat map utilized
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at trial (R. 345-46, letter to Ms. Monette
Hurtado, dated February 13, 1996, and filed on February 20, 1996);
21.

By way of

appellate

counsel

letter dated February
requested

that

Ms.

13, 1996, Defendant's

Hurtado

provide

further

information concerning the circumstances surrounding the writing by
the Kinko's employee on the plat map utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit
1 at trial
22.
request

{Id.);

On or about February 14, 1996, Ms. Hurtado responded to the
for

further

information

information by informal discovery

by

refusing

concerning

to

provide

any

the writing by the

Kinko's employee on the Exhibit prior to trial (R. 359, letter from
Ms. Monette Hurtado to appellate counsel, dated February 14, 1996,
attached to Motion For Continuance of Hearing as Attachment 2 ) ;
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23.
For

On February 23, 1996, Defendant / Appellant filed a Motion

Continuance

of

Hearing

and

a Motion

For

Discovery

seeking

information related to the determination of the exhibit tampering
issue (R. 347-50, Motion For Discovery);
24.

After a hearing before the trial court on February 29,

1996, the trial court granted the Motion For Discovery and required
that Plaintiff, Weber County, respond to Defendant's request for
discovery on or before March 29, 1996 (R. 365-66, Order);
25.

On or about March 27, 1996, Plaintiff, Weber County, by and

through Deputy Weber County Attorney Monette Hurtado, responded by
written answers to Defendant's discovery request

(R. 368-72, Weber

County's Response to Defendant's Discovery Request; R. 3 73, Discovery
Certificate);
26.

Contrary to the representations made by Plaintiff through

Ms. Hurtado prior to filing Weber County's responses, Weber County,
through Deputy Weber County Attorney Monette Hurtado, responded to
Defendant's discovery requests by identifying the handwriting on the
plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, as her own writing (R. 368,
Response of Weber County to Request No. 1 of Defendant's Motion For
Discovery).

Such writing was made on the Exhibit on the morning of

January 12, 1995, prior to trial (R. 369, Response of Weber County to
Request Nos. 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For Discovery);
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27.

On June 26, 1996, the trial court signed its Findings,

which were entered on July 10, 1996, and received by Defendant's
counsel on July 12, 1996 (R. 374-76, Findings);
28.

On July 22, 1996, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend and

Clarify Findings and a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Amend
and Clarify Findings (R. 377-85, Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings
and Memorandum

in Support

of

same) .4

In the Motion,

Defendant

specifically objected to various findings of the trial court, moved
the trial court for additional findings concerning matters that the
trial court failed to address based on the evidence before it, and
requested further evidence by deposition concerning the circumstances
surrounding the alteration to the Exhibit (R. 3 81-84, Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings);
29.

On July 25, 1996, Defendant, through counsel, filed a

Notice of Deposition (R. 386-87, Notice of Deposition) and on July
26, 1996, served Ms. Hurtado with a Subpoena for the purpose of
taking her deposition on August 13, 1996

(R. 388-90, Subpoena and

Affidavit of Service);

4

Both of the July 22, 1996, date stamps on the Motion to Amend
and Clarify Findings and the Memorandum in Support in the record,
which were filed on July 22, 1996, have inexplicably been crossed out
and date stamped as July 23, 1996. Appellate counsel, when filing
these documents, obtained a date stamped copy of the same, which show
that the documents were filed on July 22, 1996.
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30.

On August 2, 1996, Plaintiff, Weber County, through Ms.

Hurtado, filed a Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum to Quash
(R. 3 91-97, Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum);
31.

On August

13, 1996, Defendant,

through

counsel, filed

another Notice of Deposition (R. 400-01, Notice of Deposition) and on
August 13, 1996, served Ms. Hurtado with a Subpoena for the purpose
of taking her deposition on August 23, 1996 (R. 388-90, Subpoena and
Affidavit of Service);
32.

On August 14, 1996, Defendant filed a Rule 4-501 Notice to

Submit for Decision, informing the trial court that the Motion to
Amend and Clarify Findings, which was filed on July 22, 1996, and to
which Plaintiff did not respond, was at issue and ready for decision
by the court (R. 402-04, Rule 4-501 Notice to Submit For Decision);
33.

On August 16, 1996, Plaintiff, through Ms. Hurtado, filed

a Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum to Quash

(R. 4 05-07,

Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum);
34.

On August 16, 1996, Plaintiff, through Ms. Hurtado, mailed

a copy of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order to appellate counsel (R. 413, Certificate of Mailing);
35.

On August 22, 1996, the trial court quashed the subpoena

served on Ms. Hurtado on July 26, 1996 (R. 417-18, Order Granting
Weber County's Motion to Quash);
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36.

On

August

28,

1996,

Defendant

filed

his

Response

in

Opposition to Motion to Quash (R. 421-26, Response of Defendant in
Opposition to Motion to Quash);
37.

On August 28, 1996, Defendant, through counsel, filed an

Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order,

in which Defendant

Clarify

Findings previously

incorporated

his Motion

filed on July

to Amend

22, 1996

and

(R. 427-29,

Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order);
38.

Without any reference or ruling on the pending Motion to

Amend and Clarify Findings, the trial court, on August 28, 1996,
signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 4 0813, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order);
39.

On

several

subsequent

occasions,

appellate

counsel

contacted and spoke with both the clerk's office, and at least on one
occasion spoke with the trial court's clerk concerning the trial
court's rulings on the pending Motions;
40.

Almost sixteen months later, on December 26, 1997, the Utah

Court of Appeals received the trial court's Findings and Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order signed by the trial court on August 28,
1996.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The

State's

evidence

at

trial

was

insufficient

to

establish, as an integral element of the charged crimes, Defendant's
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ownership of the subject property beyond a reasonable doubt inasmuch
as the State all but completely failed, among other things, to prove
ownership of the property by Defendant during the time period alleged
in

the

Information.

Moreover,

the

Trial

Court

erred

in

its

determination, both in its denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and in its ruling, that the State had proved Defendant's ownership of
the property as an element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable
doubt and thereby denied Defendant of his constitutional right to due
process.
2.
not

By refusing to rule on the pending motions, the trial court

only

failed

surrounding

the

to

fully

altered

and

exhibit

fairly
as

address

implicitly

all

the

required

issues
by

this

Court's order concerning temporary remand, but it frustrated the
judicial process by its failure to fully and fairly resolve the
matters before it pertaining to the altered exhibit.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE STATE'S EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH, AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED
CRIMES, DEFENDANT'S OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT INASMUCH AS THE STATE ALL
BUT COMPLETELY FAILED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO PROVE
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BY DEFENDANT DURING THE TIME
PERIOD ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
a)

The Trial Court erred in its determination that
the State had proved Defendant's ownership of
the property as an element of the crimes charged
beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby denied
25

Defendant
process.

of his constitutional

right

to due

When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a
bench trial, the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous"
standard, "which requires that xif the findings (or the trial court's
verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the
verdict) will be set aside.'"

State

431-32 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v.
1987)); Provo

City

Corp.

v.

Spotts,

v.

Featherson,

Walker,

findings

(or

781 P. 2d 424,

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

861 P.2 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

The appellate court will not disturb the findings unless they are
clearly erroneous."
Coates,

Featherson,

781 P. 2d at 432

735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987)).

(citing Lemon

v.

In addition, the appellate

court gives due regard to the opportunity of the "trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (made

applicable to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-3526(7)) .
"A fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the State
must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

State

v.

619

Starks,

P.2d 694
proof

of

627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) (citing State v. Torres,
(Utah 1980)).
a

criminal

Moreover, "it has long been assumed that
charge

constitutionally required."

In

beyond
re
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Winship,

a

reasonable

doubt

is

397 U.S. 358, 362, 90

S.Ct. 1068, 1071
establish

(1970).

"It is the duty of the Government to

. . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This notion --

basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society -is a requirement

and a safeguard of due process of law in the

historic, procedural content of 'due process.'" Leland
U.S.

790, 802-03, 72 S.Ct.

dissenting); see also
S.Ct.

2319,

2327

1002, 1009

Patterson

(1977)

v.

("the

(1952)

New York,

Due

Process

v. Oregon,

(Frankfurter,

343
J.,

432 U.S. 197, 210, 97
Clause

requires

the

prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
charged").5
The standard of evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.
re

Winship,

397 U.S. at 363, 90 S.Ct. at 1072.

In

"It is a prime

instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
error.

The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption

of innocence -- that bedrock

'axiomatic and elementary' principle

5

According to well-settled United States Supreme Court case law,
the requirement that the State prove all elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, together with its surrounding rules of evidence, "developed to
safeguard men [and women] from dubious and unjust convictions, with
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property." Brinegar
v.
United
States,
338 U.S. 160, 174, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949). In
fact, "the requirement [of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt] is
implicit in 'constitutions . . . [which] recognize the fundamental
principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and
liberty.'"
In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072
(1970) (quoting Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469, 488, 16 S.Ct.
353, 358 (1895)) .
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whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law.'"

Id.

(quoting Coffin

432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403

v.

United

States,

156 U.S.

(1895)).

As a matter of well-settled law, "circumstantial evidence alone
may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused."
Nickles,

728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986).

State

v.

Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient to convict "if it is of 'such quality and quantity as to
justify a [a determination of] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State
P.2d

v.

Span,

at 127).

819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting Nickles,
Moreover,

"[c]riminal

728

convictions cannot rest on

conjecture or supposition; they must be established by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt."

See Workman,

852 P.2d at 987 (noting that the

State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute proof
beyond

a reasonable

doubt

is to attack one of the most

sacred

constitutional safeguards at its core").
When

challenging

the

sufficiency

of

the

evidence,

a

"x [d] ef endant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient.'"
v.

Hayes,

Vigil,
948

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State

840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied,
(Utah 1993)).

Notwithstanding,

State
v.

857 P.2d

the appellate court has the

ultimate power to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims such as the issue in this case concerning the State's failure
28

to

prove

all

of

the

elements

of

the

crimes

charged

reasonable doubt as required by the constitutional
process.

See

State

v.

Thurman,

beyond

a

right to due

846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993).

The State, in the case at bar, charged Defendant by way of
Information with a zoning ordinance violation allegedly in violation
of Weber County Zoning Ordinance 5-1 et seg., and a fire ordinance
violation allegedly in violation of Weber County Fire Code Ordinance
11-1-1 et seg., and the Utah Fire Code § 79.101 et seg. (R. 1-3,
Information).

The

alleged

violations

occurred

on

the

subject

property located at approximately 4425 East Highway 162 in Weber
County between September 22, 1992, and June 22, 1994 (Count I ) , and
May 6, 1994, and June 22, 1994 (Count II), respectively {Id.).

An

integral element of the crimes charged against Defendant is ownership
of the property in question.
Even when the evidence presented by the State during its casein-chief, as set forth verbatim in the Statement of Facts above (see
Statement of Facts, H^f3-11) , is viewed in a light most favorable to
the trial court's ruling,6 the evidence is wholly insufficient to
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant's ownership of the
property during the alleged time periods in the Information.
State's

case-in-chief,

in

the

course

6

of

presenting

In the

Plaintiff's

The trial court, as the record indicates, did not enter any
written findings of fact in support of its ruling. Moreover, the
transcript of the trial court's ruling is essentially devoid of any
verbal findings of fact in support of its ruling.
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Exhibit

1,

the

State

failed

to

make

the

foundational

showing

necessary to authenticate the Exhibit as an accurate plat map from
the Weber County Recorder's Office.

In so doing, the State failed

to prove ownership by Defendant of the subject property during the
alleged time periods attendant to the charged crimes.
In the course of Mr. Barker's testimony as Director of the Weber
County Planning Commission during the State's case-in-chief, Mr.
Barker referred to and utilized Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 to establish
ownership by Defendant of the property
Trial).

(R. 76-77, Transcript of

Mr. Barker's testimony further indicates that he utilized

ownership books from his own office rather than those from the Weber
{Id.).

County Recorder's Office to research ownership of the property

On cross-examination, Mr. Barker admitted, in contradiction to his
prior testimony, that he actually utilized the correspondence in his
file to determine ownership of the property (see id.

at R. 84-85),

that there was another person in his office more qualified to answer
questions concerning ownership of the property

(see id.

at R. 84,

lines 22-24), and that he did not recall a property plat (see id.

at

R. 84, lines 21-22).
During its case-in-chief, the State, in the course of testimony
by

Mr. Edward T. Reed, a former Weber County Planning Commission

member, attempted to establish Defendant's ownership of the subject
property by having Mr. Reed refer to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (Id.
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at R.

87,

lines

6-14).7

foundational

Again,

accuracy

as

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

to

the

State

the

failed

alleged

to

plat

establish

map

any

utilized

as

In addition, the State failed to make any

showing by someone at least familiar with the preparation of the plat
map in the Weber County Recorder's Office to establish that indeed
the exhibit accurately represented the status of property ownership
as depicted by the plat.

Further, even if one were to assume that

the plat accurately reflected the status of property ownership, which
under the circumstances of the evidence presented at trial is a leap,
the State also failed to make the requisite showing to establish the
time period of property ownership represented by the plat map.
State

v. Harman,

See

767 P. 2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that

the appellate court "will not make 'speculative leap[s] across . . .
remaining gap[s]' in the evidence")

(quoting State

v.

Petree,

659

P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983)).
The State's utilization of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, during its
case-in-chief, to establish Defendant's ownership of the subject
property

is

especially

troubling

7

in

light

of

the

fact

that

0n cross-examination, Mr. Reed admitted that he based his
determination concerning Defendant's ownership of the property on
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (see R. 99, lines 5-13, Transcript of Trial).
When asked when Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was made, Mr. Reed responded
that he "couldn't tell [Defendant's counsel] when it was made." (See
id. at R. 99, lines 14-16). In fact, upon further cross-examination,
Mr. Reed admitted that, precisely speaking, he actually didn't
remember in the course of his investigation who he was told as being
the owner of the property (Id. at R. 102-03).
31

Plaintiff's counsel, Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado, hand-wrote
the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 prior to
trial on the morning of January 12, 1995 (R. 3 69, Response of Weber
County

to Request

Discovery; see also
is

the

failure

Nos.

3,

4,

and

7 of

Defendant's

Motion

For

Statement of Facts, f 1(20-26) -8 Equally troubling,
by

Deputy

Weber

County

Attorney

Hurtado,

as

Plaintiff's counsel, to inform either the trial court or opposing
counsel of her alteration or enhancement to the trial exhibit prior
to offering Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and referring to the Exhibit as
evidence at trial.

This fact alone, underscores the failure by the

prosecution to prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.

See Harman,

161 P.2d at 568 ("Every element of the

crime [s] charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the

evidence does not support those elements, the verdict must fail.").
Also

during

the

State's

case-in-chief,

in

the

course

of

eliciting testimony by M2. Yvonne E. Storey, a prior owner of the
subject property, testified that, according to her understanding, the
subject property had been "deeded" to Mr. Earl Chambers, Defendant's
father

(See R.

Ill, Transcript

8

of

Trial).

This

testimony

is

Ms. Hurtado's alteration or enhancement of Plaintiff's Exhibit
1 is exacerbated by the fact that she, in response to requests
concerning the altered exhibit, initially represented that a Kinko's
employee, per her instructions, had handwritten the name "Ronnie Earl
Chambers" on the plat map utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at trial
(see R. 345-46, letter from appellate counsel to Deputy Weber County
Attorney Hurtado, dated February 13, 1996, and filed on February 20,
1996).
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indicative of the confusion that existed at trial, both on the part
of

the prosecution

and

the trial

court, concerning

the

crucial

distinction to be made between the identity of Defendant, Ronnie Earl
Chambers,

and his

father, Earl

Transcript of Trial; see

also

Chambers

(see, e.g.,

R.

Statement of Facts Ull). 9

139-41,

As evinced

by the foregoing evidence presented at trial, there existed at least
a hypothesis that someone other than Defendant owned the subject
property.

The evidence at trial also supports the existence of the

hypothesis that even if one were to assume that Defendant did own the
subject property, that he did not own the property during the time
periods

alleged

in

the

Information.

The

existence

of

these

hypotheses necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's
guilt.

Therefore,

the

Defendant's convictions.
1986); see

evidence
See State

is
v.

Hill,

insufficient

to

support

727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.10

9

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (Letter dated June 16, 1994, from Mr.
Glen H. Burton, Weber District Fire Chief, to Deputy County Attorney
Hurtado, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Addenda C ) , in which Mr. Burton represents to Ms. Hurtado that the
subject property "is a construction equipment storage site owned by
Earl Chambers." Mr. Earl Chambers is Defendant's father.
10

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "elements
of the offense" mean:
(a)
The
conduct,
attendant
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As can be see from a review of the evidence at trial, the
evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's convictions inasmuch
as the evidence, or essentially the total lack thereof, leads to a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial
court.

Reversal

for insufficiency of the evidence

is therefore

appropriate in the instant case.
b)

The

The
Trial
Court,
in
the
course
denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss after the State
rested its case and in the course of its ruling,
erred in its determination that the State had
proved Defendant's ownership of the property as
an element of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt -- thereby denying Defendant of
his constitutional right to due process.

appellate

court

has

the

ultimate

power

to

conduct

an

independent review of constitutional claims such as the issue in this
case concerning the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as
required by the constitutional right to due process.
Thurman,
deference

846 P. 2d 1256, 1266
is

accorded

to

(Utah 1993) .

factual

See State

v.

Although considerable

findings,

the

trial

court's

conclusion of law that ownership by Defendant of the subject property
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt is given no special deference

circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense; or
(b) The
culpable
mental
state
required.
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See State

and thus reviewed for correctness.

v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

939 (Utah 1994) .
Upon the State resting its case, Defendant's trial counsel moved
to dismiss on the grounds that the State had failed to tie the
charges

to Defendant

inasmuch as there had

"been absolutely no

testimony whatsoever" that Defendant was "conducting anything on that
property

. . ." and that there had been only "futile attempts to

establish that he is the supposed property owner . . . ." (R. 162,
lines 4-14, Transcript of Trial).

The trial court denied the motion,

stating, "The testimony has, in fact, been -- and is shown up there
-- that that particular plat [Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that can be
challenged, clearly -- shows that the owner of this property is the
defendant.

As a result of that, the motion is denied at this point."

(R. 162, lines 19-23, Transcript of Trial).

In response, Defendant's

trial counsel argued that
There's been no testimony . . . as to when that
map was created.
There is no testimony that
that map was created during the periods of time
that the allegation is made that [Defendant]
made that offense. And I don't think the Court
can rely upon that to attach criminal activity
to my client. Simply that somebody has put his
name on something that hasn't been established,
a foundation or anything like that.
(R. 163, Transcript

of Trial).

Further,

in the course of its

determination that Defendant violated the zoning ordinance, the trial
court, as the basis for its ruling, stated:
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Some question had been raised about whether or
not -- who owns this property.
The prima
facie
standard
was met when the plats were admitted from the
county recorder's office showing the defendant owns
that. There is a deed here in '91. The brother has
testified that this is the other brother's property
and he allows him on with that equipment.11
(R. 327, lines 5-10, Transcript of Trial) (Emphasis added).
By determining, in the course of its foregoing rulings, that the
State had proven Defendant's ownership of the subject property beyond
a

reasonable

doubt,

the

trial

court

denied

Defendant

of

his

constitutional right to due process.

II.

BY REFUSING TO RULE ON THE PENDING MOTIONS, THE TRIAL
COURT NOT ONLY FAILED TO FULLY AND FAIRLY ADDRESS ALL
THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ALTERED EXHIBIT AS
IMPLICITLY REQUIRED BY THIS COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING
TEMPORARY REMAND, BUT IT FRUSTRATED THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS BY ITS FAILURE TO FULLY AND FAIRLY RESOLVE THE
MATTERS BEFORE IT PERTAINING TO THE ALTERED EXHIBIT.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), in relevant part, provides
that " [u]pon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after

lx

During the cross-examination of Defendant's witness, Mr. Greg
Chambers, Defendant's brother, the prosecution, inappropriately and
beyond the scope of direct examination, presented, over the objection
of Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff's Exhibit 16, which is apparently
a Quit-Claim Deed from Mr. Eric B. Storey to Mr. Ronnie Earl
Chambers, dated March 20, 1998, and recorded that same day (R. 28687, Transcript of Trial; see a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's
Exhibit 16 (Quit-Claim Deed) , attached hereto as Addenda D) .
Notwithstanding, the State failed to establish that the legal
description on the Deed is in fact the same property as that of the
subject property. Further, even if one were to assume that it was
the same property, the State again failed to establish the period of
time of Defendant's ownership of the property.
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entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly."

Rule 52(b) is made

applicable to criminal proceedings by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
81(e), which provides that "[t]hese rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is not other
See State

applicable statute or rule. . . . "

v. Goodman,

763 P.2d

786 (Utah 1988) .
In the Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings filed on July 22,
1996, Defendant specifically objected to the trial court's finding
that "No objections where [sic] raised by the defendant either to the
introduction, use or acceptance [of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1]."

Rather,

the record indicates that Defendant's trial counsel moved to dismiss
and objected to the trial court's reliance on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
for lack of foundation and other reasons, which the trial court
overruled (See R. 162-63, Transcript of Trial, pp. 103-04) .
Defendant, by way of his Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings,
also objected
attorney
that

to the trial

court's

finding

that

" [b]ecause the

[i.e., Deputy Weber County Attorney Monette Hurtado] felt

it may

be

difficult

to

see

the

names

on

the

map

[i.e.,

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] at a distance, she traced over the letters in
ink."
Hurtado

To the contrary, Plaintiff's Exhibit
did not, in fact, trace over

1 evinces that Ms.

letters on the plat map.

Rather, new and different letters were handwritten in on the plat
map, which was utilized by Plaintiff's counsel as Plaintiff's Exhibit
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1 at trial.

Such a finding by the trial court is against the clear

weight of evidence shown by the blown up copy of the plat map.
Further, by way of his Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings, and
based

on

grounds

previously

cited,

Defendant

objected

to

and

challenged the trial court's conclusion that "the exhibit was not
tampered with, that any enhancements

to the poster

[Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1] took place prior to the exhibit being offered and then
inspected by the attorney for the defendant, and that no objection
was raised on the acceptance of the exhibit."
Additionally, the trial court neglected to make any findings
addressing

Plaintiff's

Defendant's

appellate

counsel's

counsel

that

initial

representation

to

a Kinko's

employee, per

the

instructions of Plaintiff's counsel, handwrote the new matter on the
Exhibit.

The trial court also failed to make any findings as to the

failure of Plaintiff's counsel to inform either the trial court or
Defendant's trial counsel of the alteration to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
prior to offering the same as an exhibit at trial.
The trial court failed to rule of Defendant's Motion to Amend
and Clarify Findings and his Objection to the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, which incorporated the Motion
to Amend and Clarify Findings filed on July 22, 1996.

By so doing,

the trial court failed to completely address the issues related to
the alteration of the Exhibit as Ordered by this Court on January 29,
1996.

As a result, the trial court frustrated the judicial process
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and failed to comply with this Court's Order concerning temporary
remand.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this Court's instructions as
stated in its opinion.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
METHOD OF DISPOSITION. RETAINING JURISDICTION
Defendant

requests oral argument because oral argument will

materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional
right to due process by requiring the State to prove all elements of
the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, which, based on the
facts

of

the

instant

appeal,

involve

issues

requiring

further

development in these areas of criminal law for the benefit of bar and
public.

Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of

disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the
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Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value
and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j^ffi day of July, 1998.
ARNOTJD\& WIGGINS, P.C.

^^S-eetfer L W^ggins
AttorneysTor Appellant

40

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Scott L Wiggins, hereby certify that I personally caused to
be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoinq BRIEF OF
APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following, on this jftf)day of
June, 1998:
Ms. Monette Hurtado
Deputy Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd. #230
Ogden, t£T 8^4M

\ll '
v

V22.

-£cot£^j Wiggins
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ADDENDUM
Addenda A:

Judgment, Sentence
1995

Addenda B:

Copy of Altered Portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (as
altered by Deputy County Attorney Hurtado)

Addenda C:

Copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 - Letter (dated June
16, 1994) from Glen H. Burton, Chief of the Weber Fire
District, to Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado)

Addenda D:

Copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 - Quit-Claim Deed
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(Commitment) - entered April 20,

Addendum A

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT- OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
VS

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

CHAMBERS, RONNIE EARL
3352 E 3350 N
EDEN
UT 84310

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:
CITATION:

941002275
/ /
B57
COUNT: 5445
04/20/95
,

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 5-1.1 ZONING VIOL
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
750.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 90 DA
Susp: 90 DA

ACS:

0

Charge: UFC-79-103 FLAMMABLE LIQUID STORAGE
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
750.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 90 DA
Susp: 90 DA

ACS:

0

FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
CALENDAR:
SENTENCING

0.00

Due:

1,500.00

0.00

Due:

1,500.00

04/20/95 09:00 AM in rm 2 with PARLEY R. BALDWIN

OS-

CHAMBERS, RONNIE EARL

CASE NO: 941002275

PAGE

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present
ATD: ARNOLD, MARK E.
PRO: HURTADO, M
Tape: B57
Count: 5445
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
Plea:
Find Guilty - Be
Chrg: ZONING VIOL
.00
Fine Amount:
750.00
Suspended:
Jail:
90 DAYS
Suspended: 90 DAYS
Plea:
Find Guilty - Be
Chrg: STORE FLAM LQUD
.00
Fine Amount:
750.00
Suspended:
Jail:
90 DAYS
Suspended: 90 DAYS
$1,000 FINE SUSPENDED WITH DEF'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDINANCES
WITHIN 30 DAYS. DEF TO APPEAR ON 5-18-95 WITH FINE PAID AND
PROPERTY CLEANED UP
DEF'S CONVICTION IS ENTERED

fa THExi COURT
-

^

.

'

JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.

oor

2

Addendum B

FILED
F

E B - 4 1998

COURT OF APPALS

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

•tiir.ti-.iKi',

ljM;M''i-IU'

NOV 1 h 1995
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

\I&M jti-ei'tMJsl.-; tjrM.tiatMsC'*
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Addendum C

u/n

a

BOARD OF TRUSI t:FS
SCOTT W. HADLEY
PAUL V. SKEEN
LAMAR HOLT
JOEANDERSON
KEITH BUTLER
DENNIS MONTGOMB ;,' v
HUNTSVILLE REP.
WEST HAVEN REP

WEBER FIRE DISTRICT
1871 NORTH 1350 WEST
OGDEN, UTAH 84404
782-3580

JON 1 P, 1CQ4

June 16, 1994

ADMINISTRATION
GLEN BURTON - CHIEF
DAVID AUSTIN - ASST CI /!•

Monette Hurtado
County Attorney's Office
2549 Washington Blvd.
OgdeaTTT 84401

Dear Ms. Hurtado:
On May 6, 1994, Ed Reed and 1 inspected the property at HWY #162 at approximately 3100 East.
This site is a construction equipment storage site owned by Earl Chambers.
At the request of the County Commissioners, I have IKUL observing the site over the past few
months. Attention was aimed specifically at the above ground fuel storage tanks My previous
inspections had indicated that the fuel tanks were empty and not being used.
During a drive by in April I noticed a fuel pump had been placed and appeared to be in use. On
my inspection on May 6th, T noled the tanks were piped andfittedto the pump lor use. A
discussion with Earl Chambers confirmed the use and he admitted the contents of the tank were
diesel fuel. I indicated to Mr. Chambers that the tanks were not approved for use and that he
should remove the tanks as soon as possible.
The fuel tanks located at the Chambers site do not comply with the Uniform Fire Code, Article
#79 - Flammable and Combustible Liquids.
If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to call me.
Sincerely,
WEBER FIRE DISTRICT
^

< (-6^\^ '

I i

.J^l-tsl/lf-.

Glen H. Burton
Chief- Administrator

Hty n

MaintiH \A

GHBrldp

I

Date Received .... - J
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